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How can regulation keep up with transactions? The contemporary world economy make it 
easier to produce and sell across national borders. The partition of transactions into separate 
geographical components in turn makes it easier to pick and choose regulatory regimes. Antitrust 
law has dealt with this problem for nearly a century. At one time it regarded the assignment of a 
transaction to a particular territory as a prerequisite for the application of its rules; lately it has 
required much less. As a result, overlapping national regulation has become the dominant 
structure.
Overlapping regulation has its own problems. National regimes may impose inconsistent 
rules and pursue conflicting ends. In response, regulators and scholars have begun to explore the 
possibility of international governance. The proposals vary, but at their heart lies a conviction 
that the inadequacies of national regulation justify the creation of international institutions to 
promote coordination of national regulatory programs.1
I argue, in opposition to most commentators, that dispensing with international institutions 
seems the most promising approach to the problem. Creation of new international institutions to 
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grapple with antitrust or assigning this task to existing organizations presents underappreciated 
risks, and the status quo of near international anarchy has underappreciated benefits. The 
growing call by regulators and scholars to widen and deepen international cooperation regarding 
competition policy needs to be resisted. Judge Wood, a leading authority on international 
antitrust, recently wrote that “Harmonization is something to which only a curmudgeon would 
take exception.”3 I rise to that challenge.4
My argument against international cooperation has both negative and affirmative elements. 
On the negative side, the claims for international imposition of either substantive rules of 
antitrust law or assignments of regulatory jurisdiction rest more on hope than evidence. There are 
good reasons to believe that either form of cooperation will produce undesirable outcomes. In 
particular, government failure at the national level mat replicate itself at the international level, 
yet international regimes are more difficult to unwind than is domestic regulation.
On the affirmative side, I identify forces underlying international economic relations among 
the world’s most prosperous and powerful states that can punish those nations whose antitrust 
produce substantial losses in global welfare, and reward those that employ policies that enhance 
global welfare. In an information-based economy with substantial international mobility of 
financial and human capital and significant international trade, states that impose an antitrust law 
that protects domestic producers from welfare-enhancing competition should experience lower 
levels of investment and innovation. Countries that use competition law to punish more efficient 
foreign producers will suffer losses in consumer welfare without obtaining any offsetting 
competitive gains, once innovation losses are taken into account. Countries that use competition 
law to punish foreign producers that engage in inefficient forms of industrial organization, on the 
other hand, should experience some economic benefits.
My argument fits into a larger project.5 Since the end of the Cold War, the pull towards 
greater international cooperation in economic regulation has seemed irresistible. The growing 
prominence of existing institutions, especially the World Trade Organization, the International 
Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 
and the organs of the European Union and the North American Free Trade Agreement, is 
matched by calls for the creation of new regimes with additional regulatory powers. Much of the 
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criticism of these developments reflects either a deep suspicion of the culture and values of late-
stage capitalism and global markets or an atavistic celebration of national sovereignty. My 
critique is different. One does not have to reject markets and competition as virtuous means to 
advance human liberty and dignity, nor privilege the nation state as a paragon of democratic 
governance, to resist the kinds of international cooperation that seem to loom in the world 
economy’s future. I argue that one can accept the inevitability of the complex of phenomena too 
easily lumped together under the facile rubric of “globalization,” worry about its consequences 
for people around the world, understand the limitations of nation states in the face of these 
challenges, and still express skepticism about the burgeoning growth of an international 
technocracy. International antitrust simply presents an opportunity to test this general argument.
This paper proceeds in three parts. First, I provide a positive account of the incentives 
countries face under conditions of international trade to choose competition policies that do not 
maximize global welfare. This accounts rests on a demonstration of the inseparability of 
competition policy from trade policy, and on a comparison of the potential welfare losses 
resulting from protection-motivated competition law and conventional tariff-based protection. I 
argue that the less transparent nature of competition law makes its trade effects especially 
troubling. Second, I review proposals to develop international regimes either to harmonize 
substantive competition law or to allocate regulatory jurisdiction. I identify reasons why such 
regimes are likely to be unsatisfactory. The same considerations that lead countries to use 
competition law as a form of protection remain relevant in the context of international relations. 
Moreover, an international regime will present additional problems of administration, 
application, and adaptation. Third, I discuss the long-term incentives to avoid protection that 
nations face under conditions of capital mobility. I review the empirical literature on trade and 
development and argue that a similar positive correlation should exist between optimal choices 
of competition policy and economic growth. In the conclusion I explore the limits of my 
argument and suggest areas for future inquiry.
I. THE PROTEAN NATURE OF COMPETITION POLICY AND ITS POTENTIAL FOR ABUSE 
Part of the problem of international antitrust is understanding the relationship between 
competition policy and antitrust law. Most U.S. regulators and some scholars seem to take for 
granted that the two subjects are congruent. A consensus among them exists about the goals of 
competition policy – principally the maximization of consumer welfare – and the general 
soundness of the means the United States uses to pursue that end. It seems easy enough to 
assume that the rest of the world understands what we mean when we talk about competition and 
consumer welfare, and not too hard to believe that any disagreements about optimal competition 
policy stems from an incomplete understanding of the state of the debate in the United States.
A moment’s reflection, however, will suggest the difficulty of the problem of creating 
international competition law. From an international perspective, we do not have a common 
vocabulary or sense of subject, much less a common commitment to substantive ends.6 Once one 
6 See Wolfgang Pape, Socio-Cultural Differences and International Competition Law, 5 Eur. L.J. 438 (1999).
appreciates how undefined the concept of competition policy is, the difficulties of coordinating 
national regulatory regimes becomes clearer.
First, I explain why competition policy has no logical boundaries, and instead bleeds into 
industrial policy and, more importantly, trade policy. Second, I provide a theoretical argument 
supporting the prediction that variance among nations will lead to significant differences in 
national competition policies. In particular, I explain how convention competition policy 
techniques – merger regulation and attacks on producer collusion – can function as a trade 
barrier. Third, I provide evidence that important states on occasion do use competition policy for 
protectionist ends. This undermines the often unstated assumption that only insignificant barriers 
stand in the way of a coordinated and institutionalized global antitrust regime.
A. What Is Competition Policy?
Competition policy means many different things to its various practitioners and students. At a 
formal level, its boundaries may seem clear. A government invokes competition policy to 
regulate private actors who coordinate their economic choices.7 U.S. antitrust law seems the 
principal and best example. But what of government decisions not to regulate economic 
coordination? Is this weak competition policy or, behind a facade of regulatory indifference, 
governmental direction of economic cooperation? Once one recognizes the difficulty of 
distinguishing indifference from direction, it becomes impossible to cabin competition policy so 
nicely.
The fundamental indeterminancy of the concept becomes even clearer when one looks at its 
implementation in practice. Under the aegis of competition policy, governments regulate 
producer choices, including decisions to cooperate with other producers. Regulation of prices, of 
marketing practices and of the array of products offered all come within its scope. Competition 
regulation involves decisions about competition, but does not necessarily imply a preference for 
the consumer welfare criterion as the benchmark of competitive markets. Support for a national 
champion, suppression of large-scale efficient producers that threaten politically influential small 
producers, and setting quotas on output all can constitute competition policies, even though most 
economists would regard these strategies as presumptively inimical to consumer welfare.8
This seemingly obvious point is critical. Most regulators, practitioners, and scholars in the 
United States believe that competition policy involves government intervention against 
7 See Eleanor M. Fox, International Antitrust and the Doha Dome, note  supra, at 915: “It is often said that antitrust is 
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anticompetitive behavior by private actors. But competition cannot be an end to itself. Some 
kinds of collusion can be unambiguously desirable, such as (some) provision of standardized 
goods or long-term supply contracts. As Oliver Williamson famously observed decades ago, 
markets and organizational hierarchies typically exist as alternatives, and there are no a priori 
reasons always to prefer one over the other.9
One cannot have a competition policy, then, without some concept of desirable cooperation. 
It follows that a state concerned about the level of competition in a given market might either 
forbid or mandate particular forms of cooperation. Competition policy thus fades into industrial 
policy. They are conceptually the same, even if the two terms suggest different regulatory 
methodologies, attitudes, and specialists.
Except in closed economies, competition and trade policy also overlap. Trade policy at its 
heart involves choices over the level of competition between domestic and foreign producers a 
state will permit or encourage. This point seems obvious as a matter of logic, but, for reasons I 
explore below, it becomes paramount with respect to industries that have increasing returns to 
scale, which is to say the most important sectors of the richest national economies. In many 
instances, competition and trade policies thus become two sides of the same coin.
Why does a conviction persist that competition policy constitutes an autonomous discipline 
with its own technical expertise? Competition law appeared in the United States in response to 
private decisions to consolidate production. Its principal manifestation was the Sherman Act, 
which attacked cooperative actions “in restraint of trade” and abuses of monopoly power.10 We 
should see this congruence between competition law and public regulation of private cooperation 
and consolidation as a historical accident, however, and not as the core of what constitutes 
competition policy.
Even with its historical background, U.S. competition law never has manifested an 
implacable hostility to all forms of industrial consolidation. It accepts, for example, cooperation 
among producers organized or mandated by the several U.S. states,11 as well as collusive 
political action to bring about such state mandates.12 The United States for almost a century has 
promoted collusion among exporters,13 and more recently has supported similar cooperation 
among producers in supposedly strategic economic sectors such as semiconductor design and 
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1995).
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production.14 When one turns to Europe or Japan, examples of competition policy coexisting 
with and even reinforcing coordinated producer behavior become abundant.
The overlap between competition and trade policy leads to two important complications. 
First, as I discuss below, a state may tailor its regulatory choices to its position in the world 
economy, favoring producers or consumers depending on which actors predominate locally. 
Second, a state may purport to pursue a uniform competition policy but in practice apply 
different rules to foreign and domestic actors. In theory, trade law forbids this: All developed 
countries have accepted an obligation of “national treatment” or nondiscrimination between its 
own subjects and others.15 But the protean nature of competition policy promotes administrative 
discretion and facilitates discrimination disguised by a veil of fact-specific, balancing-of-the-
totality-of-circumstances analyses.
An obvious and pervasive example of discriminatory competition law is the antidumping 
regime that most developed countries employ.16 Formally, antidumping is part of trade law, 
while predatory pricing is the subject of antitrust. But functionally, these rules target the same 
behavior – successful price competition that crowds out competitors. In most countries, however, 
foreign producers face more onerous restrictions. Under U.S. antitrust law (which applies to 
domestic and foreign producers alike), prohibited predation requires proof of below cost sales in 
circumstances where new entrants are unlikely to enter the market once the predator raises 
prices.17 Dumping, which applies only to imports, penalizes any sale at a price below that used in 
the producer’s home market, even if the import price comprises a profit margin.18
Antidumping regimes present a specific instance of a more general problem. Imagine Good 
A, the production of which has substantial economies of scale. Further imagine that Good B is a 
substitute for Good A. Suppose that the producers of Good B can influence decisions by the 
authority that regulates the market where Goods A and B compete. If this regulatory authority 
has the discretion to forbid levels of consolidation that preclude the achievement of economies of 
scale, an enforcement action brought against the producers of Good A will protect the Good B 
producers from salutary competition. Moreover, if the competition authorities operate under a 
sufficiently discretionary mandate, they can take this action without compromising their ability 
to tolerate comparable collusion by producers of Good B. Again, my claim is that nothing in the 
concept of “competition policy” precludes regulatory choices that decrease the overall level of 
competition in a market, much less requiring the level of competition that maximizes welfare.
The broad definition of competition policy not only makes sense logically, but underscores 
the difficulties of achieving an international consensus about its content. Even if states could 
agree that efficiency – optimization of the sum of consumer and producer welfare – is the only 
14 National Cooperative Research Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-462, 98 Stat. 1815 (1984), 15 U.S.C. §§ 4301-06.
15 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. III, T.I.A.S. No. 1700.
16 See id., art. VI (authorizing antidumping regimes); Agreement on the Implementation of Article VI of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, T.I.A.S. No. 9650 (restricting antidumping regimes).
17
 For the rules governing predatory pricing, see Matsushita Electrical Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 
574 (1986).
18 See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1673-73i (1994); Council Regulation (EC) No. 384/96, O.J. L 56/1 (1996).
legitimate objective of competition policy, agreement as to whether a particular regime advances 
or detracts from efficiency would remain elusive. Specifying the optimal mix of competition and 
cooperation in a particular economic sector is inevitably controversial.19 Technological 
innovation and other kinds of change, as well as shifting consumer preferences, limit the lessons 
one can learn from a sector’s history. Once legitimate differences over the optimal level of 
competition arise, it becomes difficult, if not impossible, to determine whether a regulator is 
pursuing efficiency-driven competition policy.
The proliferation of alternative objectives for competition policy multiplies the difficulty of 
finding common ground. Given the difficulty of fixing optimal levels of competition, we should 
expect much competition law to take the form of elastic standards rather than of precise and 
constraining rules. With increased discretion comes inconsistency: One cannot insist on 
maximizing consumer welfare, for example, and still promote national champions or protect 
inefficient small producers. Tolerance of inconsistency in turn opens the door to discrimination. 
Regulatory choices driven by animus towards foreign producers can be reconciled with other, 
permissible rationales. The more open-ended and multi-factored the policy, and the greater the 
discretion of regulators to decide where and how to apply competition policy, the easier it 
becomes to disguise trade protection as competition policy.20 The possibility of strategic 
deployment of competition law would be greatest where governments have exclusive 
enforcement authority, the situation that exists almost everywhere except in the United States.21
B. Competition Policy and Local Interests
Once one accepts that competition policy embraces great, and potentially pernicious, 
flexibility, it becomes possible to speculate about what ends a given state might choose to 
pursue. Modern trade theory offers strong support for specific uses of competition rules to 
protect domestic producers. Public choice theory provides a more general explanation for why 
individual states would invoke competition policy for illiberal ends. Both analyses predict that, 
absent an effective international regime to constrain their choices, national regulation of 
competition will generate global welfare losses.
1. International Trade Theory
As a conceptual matter, three considerations can influence a state’s incentives to externalize 
the effects of its competition regulation. First, producers in the sector in question may be over- or 
under-represented in that state as compared to the global distribution of that sector’s producers. 
For example, oil and natural gas production dominates a few national economies, while many 
19 See Frank H. Easterbrook, Does Antitrust Have a Comparative Advantage? 23 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 5, 7 (1999) 
(“And here’s the big point: by and large, we can’t know when competition has ‘failed.’”)
20 Andrew T. Guzman, note  supra, at 939. See also Ed Swaine, note  supra, at 966-74.
21 Even in the United States, governmental enforcement decisions have a powerful effect on private suits, as evidenced 
by the preference of private plaintiffs to follow in the wake of Justice Department litigation. See also Mark R. Joelson, An 
International Antitrust Primer: A Guide to the Operation of United States, European Union and Other Key Competition 
Laws in the Global Economy 168-76 (2d ed. 2001) (arguing that administrative control over the content of U.S. antitrust 
control has grown significantly in the last quarter century).
important economies produce virtually none of that good (the European Union and Japan). 
Second, consumers of the good in question similarly may be over- or under-represented in the 
state. Third, the global market for the good may be more or less competitive. This last factor will 
affect the distribution between producers and consumers of potential gains from industrial 
consolidation.
Consider first a good, the production of which has increasing returns to scale up to the 
market clearing price. “Natural monopolies” and “network goods” are general instances of this 
phenomenon. The good may have declining marginal costs due to economies of scale, or the 
value created by the good may increase with its consumption. In either case, the most efficient 
producer is a monopolist.22
 Further assume that consumption of this good is more or less evenly distributed globally, if 
not per capita then per GDP. Ignoring strategic issues and the possibility of coordination, a state 
should prefer to function as the home of this industry. The state can capture some portion of the 
producer’s monopoly rents, while its consumers will suffer no more than if any other state hosted 
the monopolist.
Under these conditions (increasing returns to scale and international trade), a rational 
competition policy would have the state protect the local producer and inflict costs on the 
producers of all other states. Monopoly does not produce a global welfare losses (although some 
local consumers and producers will be worse off than they would be if the state forbade the 
monopoly) and benefits the host state to the extent of producer surplus. While some consumers 
in the host state might suffer, most of the lost consumer surplus will be externalized to outsiders.
Strategic trade theory, as developed by Krugman and others in the late 1970s, addresses 
exactly these economic features.23 It maintains that increasing returns to scale characterize 
production in many sectors and that monopoly industrial organization thus constitutes a norm 
rather than a deviation for large portions of the most developed economies. The premises of 
liberal trade theory – that international trade proceeds in competitive markets and that 
comparative advantages in production capacities determines the efficient distribution of 
production – thus do not hold. Strategic trade theory argues that the distribution of monopolist 
producers, rather than the distribution of producer endowments, explains more about trade 
patterns. As a positive matter, it predicts that the higher levels of international trade that result 
from lowered costs of transportation and communication as well as reduced legal barriers will 
bring about greater levels of industrial concentration. As a normative matter, strategic trade 
theory specifies the circumstances where states should prefer protection (broadly conceived to 
included subsidies to the local producers as well as import barriers) to free trade. This 
22 See generally William J. Baumol & David F. Bradford, Optimal Departures from Marginal Cost Pricing, 60 Am. 
Econ. Rev. 265 (1970).
23 See Strategic Trade Policy and the New International Economics (Paul R. Krugman ed. 1986); Elhanan Helpman & 
Paul R. Krugman, Market Structure and Foreign Trade – Increasing Returns, Imperfect Competition, and the International 
Economy (1985); Avinash K. Dixit & Victor Norman, Theory of International Trade (1980); Kelvin Lancaster, Intra-
industry Trade Under Perfect Monopolistic Competition, 10 J. Int’l Econ. 151 (1980); Paul R. Krugman, Increasing 
Returns, Monopolistic Competition, and International Trade, 9 J. Int’l Econ. 469 (1979).
justification for protection goes strongly against the grain of liberal trade theory, which denies 
the value of protection.24
What does strategic trade theory suggest for countries that have no hope of hosting an 
industry with increasing returns to scale? A country’s choices depend on its share of the global 
market for the good in question. Those with small shares usually would not be able to prevent the 
foreign producer from moving toward monopoly. If such a country tried to regulate the producer, 
it could either raise prices in the local market or refuse to import. Both outcomes would hurt 
consumers in the regulating country with no offsetting benefits.25
A country with a large share would have another option. Assuming a sufficiently large 
market share, such a country would have the capability to force the producer to internalize the 
costs of its regulation. It rationally would block efficient growth by the producer in instances 
where the benefits from consolidation, no matter how large, would accrue to the producer and 
the increase in competition would generate some benefits for local consumers, no matter how 
small. Put simply, under specified conditions that seem realistic if not abundant, some countries 
will have both an incentive to restrict producers from undertaking welfare-enhancing 
consolidation and cooperation, and the capacity to implement its policy. These states will choose 
a competition policy that, in terms of global efficiency, requires too much competition and not 
enough hierarchy.26
The mirror argument also applies. Some states may host producers that have diminishing 
returns to scale and export most of their production. Examples would include industries that 
depend disproportionately on factor endowments, such as extraction or farming. These states 
might benefit if their producers participated in a successful cartel. Monopoly rents would stay at 
home and the lion’s share of the lost consumer surplus would fall on consumers in the export 
markets. Under these conditions, states would embrace a competition policy that not only 
tolerates, but mandates cartelization. In other words, these states would seek to effect a 
competition policy that, in terms of global efficiency, requires too much hierarchy and not 
enough competition.27
These incentives become even more salient to the extent that states can evade the national 
treatment obligation and discriminate against foreign producers. Where this condition holds, 
regulators can apply one standard of acceptable collusion to foreign producers, and another to its 
own residents. In the case of increasing-returns-to-scale industries, a rational regulator would 
block collusion by foreign producers while encouraging local producers to consolidate and grow. 
With respect to decreasing-returns-to-scale industries, the same regulator usually would promote 
24 For discussion of the tensions between strategic trade theory and liberal theory and a reconciliation based on political 
economy arguments, see Paul R. Krugman, Is Free Trade Passé? 1 J. Econ. Persp. 131, 143 (1987) (“It is possible, then, 
both to believe that comparative advantage is an incomplete model of trade and to believe that free trade is nevertheless 
the right policy.”)
25 Cf. Alan O. Sykes, Countervailing Duty Law: An Economic Perspective, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 199, ___ (1989).
26 See Andrew T. Guzman, note  supra, at 942; Andrew T. Guzman, Choice of Law: New Foundations, 90 Geo. L.J. 
883, 906-09 (2002); Andrew T. Guzman, note  supra, at 1512-15.
27 See Andrew T. Guzman, note  supra, at 943; Andrew T. Guzman, note  supra, at 1512-18.
competition among foreign producers. If little domestic consumption and large levels of 
domestic production of the good occurred in its country, however, the regulator would tolerate or 
even promote cartelization of the industry.
In sum, both uniform and selectively enforced competition law can function as a form of 
trade protection. Because selective enforcement is harder to detect and monitor than a direct 
trade barrier, however, it may pose a greater problem than conventional forms of protection. 
Uncertainty about when competition law will apply may deter risk-averse transactors and require 
wasteful investments in precautions (such as legal services and lobbying). The ambiguous and 
elusive nature of this kind of protection also may make it more difficult to mobilize coalitions to 
oppose it. By contrast, conventional trade barriers, in the form of high tariffs or quotas, are 
quantitatively precise, easier to detect and to oppose, and generally entail lower costs of 
organizing opposition.28
2. Political Economy
The previous subsection premised its arguments on an unrealistic assumption, namely that 
political decisionmakers seek to optimize the welfare of the polity that they represent and 
govern. Positive theory predicts, and plenty of evidence confirms, that in many situations 
government will pursue outcomes that reflect the preferences of homogenous and compact 
interest groups at the expense of the general welfare.29 Lower organizational costs enable some 
groups to elicit rents from government. And one of the best studied and documented examples of 
successful rent-seeking is that of domestic producers seeking protection against foreign 
competition to the detriment of domestic consumers.30 Producers have focused identities and 
technological expertise; consumers suffer from an array of identities (worker, family member, 
sports fan) and lack specialized knowledge. It is rational for producers to invest more than 
consumers do in obtaining desired outcomes from government, and rational for politicians to 
provide a return to this investment.
28 See Alan O. Sykes, Regulatory Protectionism and the Law of International Trade, 66 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1 (1999) 
(explaining inefficiency of regulatory protection relative to tariff barriers to trade). See generally John L. McGinnis & 
Mark L. Movsesian, The World Trade Constitution, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 511, 572-80 (2000) (discussing costs of covert 
protection and its connection to nontransparent regulatory standards).
29 The canonical texts include James M. Buchanan & Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of 
Constitutional Democracy (1962); Dennis C. Mueller, Public Choice II (1989); Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective 
Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Rev. ed. 1971); Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition Among 
Pressure Groups for Political Influence, 98 Q.J. Econ. 371 (1983); Richard A. Posner, Theories of economic regulation, 5 
Bell. J. Econ. & Mgmt. Sci. 335 (1974); George J. Stigler, The theory of economic regulation, 2 Bell J. Econ. & Mgmt. 
Sci. 3 (1971).
30 The original insight is credited to Pareto. Vilfredo Pareto, Manual of Political Economy 379 (Ann S. Schwier & 
Alfred N. Page eds. & Ann S. Schwier trans. 1971) (1927). For later work developing the same point, see Dennis C. 
Mueller, Public Choice II 238-42 (1989); Mancur Olson, note  supra, at 143; Anne O. Krueger, Political Economy,
International Trade, and Economic Integration, 82 Amer. Econ. Rev. 109 (1992); Wendy Tacaks, Pressures for 
Protectionism: An Empirical Analysis, 19 Econ. Inquiry 687 (1981). See also Douglas A. Irwin & Randall S. Kroszner, 
Interests, Institutions, and Ideology in Securing Policy Change: The Republican Conversion to Trade Liberalization after 
Smoot-Hawley, 42 J.L. & Econ. 643 (1999) (tracing shift away from protection to an increase in influence of exporters, 
not of consumers).
The political economy story provides another set of explanations for variance among national 
competition policies. The ability of particular groups to minimize the costs of organization and 
political action must vary across countries, due to differences in the way politics is carried out 
and financed as much as because of differences in group characteristics. We should not expect 
similar groups to come out winners in different countries, much less win to the same extent.
To summarize, no conceptual reason exists for competition policy not to serve the ends of 
trade protection, and both modern trade theory and public choice theory identify incentives 
leading states to pursue policies that lower global welfare. What still must be established is that 
states actually vary in the regulatory choices they make in name of competition policy, and that 
this variation is inefficient from a global perspective. A secondary issue is whether states exploit 
the flexibility that competition policy gives them to impose different regulatory choices on 
foreign producers in violation of the national treatment obligation. I consider evidence of these 
practices in the next section.
C. The Evidence
By hypothesis, in a world where international trade occurs, one and only one competition 
policy can maximize global welfare. Any deviation from that policy among states must reflect 
one of four considerations:
(1) The nonconforming law applies to an economic sector not subject to international trade.
(2) The nonconforming law reflects a decision by the regulating state to reduce the welfare of 
its subjects in pursuit of a policy goal that is not amenable to welfare calculus. (A 
variation on this consideration is that people in different states may differ in their 
consumer preferences, and thus the consumer welfare criterion may vary among states.)
(3) Variations in laws reflect genuine empirical disagreements among regulators as to the 
consequences of particular regulatory choices.
(4) Variations in laws reflect efforts by a local population to externalize the costs of 
regulatory choices while capturing their benefits.
Consideration (1) is unlikely to explain differences between the major developed countries, all of 
which have significant levels of international trade. Consideration (2) seems implausible with 
respect to these states, given the abundance of standardized consumer goods (global brands) that 
trade in these economies. Significant differences among states in the content of their competition 
law – horizontal variation – could reflect either consideration (3) or (4), and is not proof of 
welfare-reducing deviations from an ideal global policy. Significant differences within states as 
to the content law applicable to domestic and foreign persons – vertical variation – is consistent 
only with consideration (4). Moreover, the presence of substantial vertical variation within a 
country at least hints that its contribution to horizontal variation also reflects consideration (4).
Surveying the competition law and enforcement practices of the major economic powers –
the United States, the European Union and Japan – we find overwhelming evidence of horizontal 
variation and significant circumstantial evidence of vertical variation. This is enough at least to 
shift the burden of proof to those who would deny that the competition laws of these countries 
that contribute to deadweight losses in the world economy. A prima facie case thus can be made 
that the status quo of international antitrust is suboptimal.
1. Horizontal Variation – Institutional Features.
Differences in institutional structure among the three principal economic powers is evident. 
The United States disperses enforcement power among two federal agencies (the Antitrust 
Division of the Justice Department and the Federal Trade Commission) and private attorneys 
general, who benefit from various financial incentives (treble damages) and procedural 
advantages (class actions, broad pretrial discovery, jury trials). A residual and not well defined 
power of States to apply their own regulatory regimes further complicates the picture.31 In the 
European Union, by contrast, the Competition Directorate of the European Commission has 
broad and preemptive power over enforcement powers. The fifteen Member States have some 
residual power to regulate competition, but all rely on a single national authority with virtually 
no private enforcement.32 Japan has a unified regulatory authority (the Fair Trade Commission), 
no subnational entities with regulatory powers, and high barriers to private litigation.33 Some 
degree of collaboration between the government and industry cartels exists, although scholars 
debate the extent and scale of the government’s contribution to these cartels.34
2. Horizontal Variation – Substantive Aspects.
The substantive goals of U.S. antitrust law reflect the shifting preferences of administrations 
as well as changes in the courts’ understanding of competition regulation. Over the last thirty 
years U.S. regulators have taken a more relaxed attitude toward forms of collusion and industrial 
concentration that seem driven by efficiency considerations. Consumer welfare has become the 
touchstone of competition policy, as opposed to opposition to the accumulation of power and 
influence in the hands of private firms. The courts also have moved in this direction, embracing 
efficiency as the principal criterion and embracing anticompetitive practices that plausibly may 
increase consumer welfare.35 Finally, for sixty years the courts have permitted state-level 
31 See authorities cited in note  supra.
32 See Notice on Cooperation between national Courts and the Commission in applying Articles 85 and 86 of the EC 
Treaty, 1993 OJ (C39) 6.
33 See John O. Haley, Antitrust in Germany and Japan – The First Fifty Years, 1947-1998, at 71-90 (2001); J. Mark 
Ramseyer & Minoru Nakazato, Japanese Law – An Economic Approach 6-9 (1999); J. Mark Ramseyer, Lawyers, Foreign 
Lawyers, and Lawyer-Substitutes: The Market for Regulation in Japan, 27 Harv. J. Int’l L. 499 (1986).
34 The traditional story of Japanese economic success between 1945 and 1990 stressed the role of the Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry in directing and even compelling cooperation among producers. Ronald Dore, Flexible 
Rigidities: Industrial Policy and Structural Adjustment in the Japanese Economy, 1970-1980 (1986); Chalmers Johnson, 
MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925-1975 (1982); Ezra Vogel, Japan as Number One: 
Lessons for America (1979). Recent work argues convincingly that this story fails to fit the evidence, and instead reflects 
excessive reliance by foreign scholars on the accounts of Japanese social scientists, whose accounts in turn were shaped by 
their Marxist or socialist ideologies. MITI failed to establish cartels that Japanese industry did not want, and could not 
immunize cooperative firms from prosecution by the Fair Trade Commission. Yoshiro Miwa & J. Mark Ramseyer, 
Capitalist Politicians, Socialist Bureaucrats? Legends of Government Planning from Japan, 38 Antitrust Bulletin ___ 
(2003).
35 Daniel J. Gifford & Robert T. Kudrle, note  supra, at 220-23.
experimentation with alternative approaches to the competition/collusion tradeoff. In a reversal 
of the normal preemption rule that underlies U.S. federalism, state-administered collusion 
displaces federal regulation.36
In form, the substantive goals of EC competition law seems virtually identical to that of the 
United States.37 Articles 81 and 82 of the current revision of the Treaty of Rome closely track 
Sections One and Two of the Sherman Act: Article 81 prohibits “concerted practices” that “may 
affect trade between Member States” and “have as their object or effect the prevention, 
restriction or distortion of competition,” while Article 82 outlaws “any abuse” of “a dominant 
position.” Given the cultural, economic, political and sociological differences between the two 
entities, however, it should surprise no one that these capacious words have achieved a 
significantly different meaning in the EC. At the risk of oversimplification, EC competition law 
evinces greater skepticism, relative to recent U.S. practice, about the benefits of producer 
consolidation and cooperation. One aspect of this skepticism, not so much articulated as 
displayed, is concern about private concentrations of power threatening governmental 
authority.38 In addition, EC competition law clearly opposes the substitution of lower-level (that 
is, national) supervision for Community-administered competition policy. Unlike the United 
States, the lower-level entities cannot authorize anticompetitive practices.39
An examination of specific policy issues further illuminates the differences between U.S. and 
EC law. No consensus exists on the distinction between successful consolidation and abuse of 
monopoly power,40 on when vertical supply and purchase commitments encourage productive 
firm-specific investments and when they unnecessarily restrict consumer choice,41 or when 
predatory pricing constitutes a genuine threat to consumer welfare and when the strategy 
contains the seeds of its own frustration, thus making regulatory intervention unnecessary.42
Some of this differences undoubtedly reflect empirical uncertainty, but others suggest 
disagreements over policy that cannot reflect a commitment to maximizing global welfare.
Japan has the Antimonopoly Law, a substantive competition law that in form follows closely 
that of the United States. But its Fair Trade Commission, although perhaps not quite the lapdog 
that some commentators portray, has not had the opportunity to develop as rich and informative a 
practice as has its U.S. and EU counterparts. It has brought criminal prosecutions against core 
36 See note  supra and accompanying text.
37 At the risk of unnecessarily complicating things, I wish to preserve the distinction between the European Union, 
based on the Maastricht Treaty as amended, which provides a framework for economic, foreign affairs, and police 
cooperation among the fifteen (soon to be twenty-five) members, and the European Community, a legal structure created 
by the Treaty of Rome as amended, which provides the legal basis for economic regulation and in particular competition 
law. Thus one can say that EC competition law applies in the European Union. In other words, the European Union is a 
place, the European Community is a source of law.
38 Eleanor M. Fox, Antitrust and Regulatory Federalism, note  supra, at 1791-93.
39 Treaty of Rome arts. 83(2)(e), 86(1), 87(1); Costa v. ENEL, [1964] E.C.R. 1141.
40 Daniel J. Gifford & Robert T. Kudrle, note  supra, at 230-34.
41 Compare Continental TV, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977), with Centrafarm v. Sterling Drug, Inc. 
(Case 15/74), [1974] E.C.R. 1147.
42 Compare John R. Lott, Jr, Are Predatory Commitments Credible? Who Should the Courts Believe? (1999), with Peter 
H. Huang, Still Preying on Strategic Reputation Models of Predation, 3 Green Bag 2nd 437 (2000).
anticompetitive behaviors, that is price fixing and output restrictions undertaken by groups of 
producers. It has not attacked other practices that result in significant costs to Japanese 
consumers, and it has no influence on government policies in some industries that protect 
numerous small producers from efficient competition by consolidated firms.43
3. Vertical Variation
Turning to evidence of vertical variation, one can describe incidents where protection 
supplies the most plausible explanation for what happened. My examples are representative, and 
by no means exhaustive. They seem sufficient to at least create a presumption that such 
protection through selective competition rules does occur.
At the outset, one should note that in all the major jurisdictions, the institutional structure of 
competition law discussed above facilitates vertical variation. The use of broad, nonspecific 
standards maximizes enforcement discretion, as opposed to precise rules that tie the enforcer’s 
hands. Of course, there exist other plausible explanations for the choice of form. The 
enforcement bureaucracy may seek to maximize its discretion for reasons unrelated to protection, 
and even a welfare-maximizing lawmaker might regard bonding costs as unacceptably high 
relative to other means of supervising the enforcement process. Nonetheless, it is relevant, 
although by no means decisive, that the substantive competition law of the United States, the EU 
and Japan all give regulators the kind of discretion that impedes monitoring to detect 
discrimination. The presence of motive and opportunity to discriminate against foreigners 
strengthens, although it does not prove, the case.
Examples from all three jurisdictions indicate that the discretion enforcers enjoy has allowed 
actions that seem inexplicable except as a way of advancing the interests of local producers. I 
begin with the United States. Several recent suits brought by both the government and private 
litigants reek of protectionism. During the run up to the 1992 presidential election, the Bush 
Administration, pressed by candidate Clinton’s charges that it did not adequately protect U.S. 
producers from foreign competitors, announced that it would abandon the Reagan Justice 
Department’s position that, except in limited instances, U.S. antitrust law would not address 
foreign anticompetitive practices that had no significant impact on U.S. consumer welfare.44 The 
Clinton Administration carried through on its campaign posture, bringing and settling a suit 
against a British firm that allegedly imposed licensing restrictions on the use of its patented 
technologies to restrict the production of flat glass manufacturing outside the United States.45
The following year it obtained an indictment against a Japanese paper company for participating 
in a conspiracy to fix the price of thermal fax paper.46 Both actions rested on dubious economic 
43 See John O. Haley, note  supra, at 154-57, 162-68 (2001).
44 U.S. Dep't of Justice, Antitrust Enforcement Policy (1992), reprinted in 62 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 
1560, at 483-84.
45 United States v. Pilkington plc, 1994-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 70,841 (D. Ariz. 1994); United States v. Pilkington plc 
and Pilkington Holdings, Inc. Civil No. CIV 94-345 TUC WDB (D. Ariz.) – Response of the United States to Public 
Comments Concerning Proposed Final Judgment, 59 Fed. Reg. 52,823 (1994).
46 United States v. Nippon Paper Industries Co., 109 F.3rd 1 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1044 (1998).
theories but succeeded in signaling a willingness to punish foreign producers to the advantage of 
their U.S. competitors.47
The private suit that most clearly reflects conventional trade protection is the epic battle 
between U.S. television set manufacturers and the Japanese consumer electronic industry. The 
trial court, the Third Circuit, and four Justices of the Supreme Court embraced a theory that 
producer collusion in the home market of the Japanese producers, coupled with successful price 
competition in the U.S. market, sufficed to make out a violation of the Sherman Act.48 This 
theory merges antitrust law with antidumping law, inasmuch as the latter gives relief to U.S. 
producers seeking protection from foreign competitors without requiring any proof of predation 
or other harm to U.S. consumers. In effect the U.S. industry sought compensation for its failure 
to compete with the Japanese producers. A few years after a narrow majority of the Supreme 
Court rejected the suit, the parallel with trade law was made explicit. The U.S. government 
successfully collected antidumping duties based on the same evidence that the U.S industry has 
assembled in its antitrust claim.49
Turning to the EU, one notes first the Commission’s notorious refusals to approve mergers of 
U.S. firms that compete with important European producers, first among them the Boeing-
McDonnell Douglas transaction.50 The suspicion that the Commission sought to give a leg up to 
Airbus, Boeing’s great rival, has been impossible to suppress. But merger regulation hardly 
represents the only Commission activity that smacks of protectionism. Other examples involve 
prosecutions for abuse of dominant position. This concept, although superficially similar to 
Section Two of the Sherman Act’s prohibition of abuse of monopoly power, in practice has a 
broader reach that seems disproportionately to take in successful competition by non-EC firms. 
A classic case is its prosecution of United Brands, the American banana producer.51 Not only did 
the Commission embrace an improbable theory of abuse, but it acted against a background of 
Community trade regulation that systematically protected bananas produced in former European 
colonies from competition by United Brands.52 Consumer welfare, in particular that of banana-
loving Germans, mattered not at all here.
In the case of Japan, one does not find prosecutions of foreign firms so much as tolerance of 
private collusion to keep out foreign competition. In this respect Japanese competition policy 
represents the stance of much of world outside of North American and Europe. Weak or 
47 By contrast, the courts have shown no willingness to punish domestic producers that collaborate with the U.S. 
government in inducing foreign producers to join in a cartel. See Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. Kissinger, 506 
F.2nd 136 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (treating dispute as moot), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1004 (1975).
48 Matsushita Electrical Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
49 Zenith Electronics Corp. v. United States, 755 F. Supp. 397 (C.I.T. 1990). Later U.S. legislation closed the gap even 
further by requiring distribution of antidumping (as well as countervailing) duties to protected domestic producers. 
Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000, P.L. 106-387, § 1(a), 114 Stat. 1549, codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1675c. 
The permissibility of this law under the Uruguay Round Agreements is currently the subject of a WTO dispute proceeding.
50 See Eleanor M. Fox, Mergers in Global Markets: GE/Honeywell and the Future of Merger Control, 23 U. PA. J. INT’L 
ECON. L. 457 (2002); Daniel J. Gifford & E. Thomas Sullivan, Can International Antitrust Be Saved for the Post-Boeing 
Merger World? A Proposal to Minimize International Conflict and to Rescue Antitrust from Misuse, 45 Antitrust Bull. 55 
(2000).
51 United Brands Co. v. Commission (Case 27/76), [1978] E.C.R. 207.
52 World Trade Organization, Report of the Appellate Body, European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale, 
and Distribution of Bananas, WTO Docs. No. WT/DS27/R/USA (May 22, 1997), WT/DS27/AB/R (Sep. 9, 1997).
nonexistent regulation of anticompetitive practices reflects the preferences of local producers, 
who seek monopoly rents both through domestic collusion and obstruction of import 
competition. Some proponents of strategic trade theory saw Japan’s competition law as one 
element of a comprehensive trade and development program. More recent scholarship suggests 
that the government simply accepts, and does not manage, industry-led cartelization.53 In a 
complaint brought to the World Trade Organization, the United States argued that Japan’s 
tolerance of inefficient retail distribution systems constituted a trade barrier in violation of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, but the WTO rejected the claim.54
Finally, one should note a particular instance of substantive convergence among all major 
industrial economies. Virtually every country expressly exempts export cartels from its 
competition law. This practice manifests a welfare calculation that gives no weight to foreign 
consumers, and suggests some indifference to local consumers that probably bear some costs 
from foreign export cartels. Regarding the exemption of export cartels as a global norm, rather 
than as local aberrations from good competition policy, reinforces the impression that 
competition law, among its many functions, serves as a source of trade protection.
At the risk of repeating myself, I do not maintain that these examples prove that competition 
law inherently or primarily operates as a tool for protection. I argue only that it is susceptible to 
such pressures, and that one can document instances where the susceptibility has manifested 
itself. The evidence undermines the conception of competition policy as something separate 
from, and motivated by different values than, trade policy. Our understanding of why states 
restrict international trade, it suggests, also may illuminate our expectations about why and when 
governments, and to a lesser degree private litigants, invoke competition law. And this insight 
leads to an obvious conclusion: If international cooperation is an effective means of advancing 
trade liberalization to the benefit of general welfare, then it will lead us to a better international 
antitrust regime as well.
D. Summary
Competition policy embodies imprecise normative judgments that invite controversy and 
defection rather than consensus and commitment. Because its scope extends to such a wide range 
of economic activity, it has the potential to inflict significant costs on many transactors. In 
particular, it tempts states both to impose nominally neutral policies that favor local producers 
and consumers at the expense of global welfare, and to administer their policies in a 
discriminatory fashion to similar ends. Uncertainty about the willingness of states to pursue this 
strategy further burdens international transactions.
If we cannot expect states to develop a coherent competition policy for international 
transactions in the absence of coordination, should we seek create some mechanism that will 
53 See Yoshiro Miwa & J. Mark Ramseyer, note  supra.
54 World Trade Organization, Report of the Panel, Japan – Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film and Paper, 
WTO Doc. No. WT/DS44/R (Mar. 31, 1998).
coordinate national competition policies? What would such coordination look like, and what 
problems might it engender? I now turn to these questions.
II. VISIONS OF INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST
The previous section establishes that states engaged in significant international trade face 
strong incentives to adopt competition laws that do not maximize global welfare. States whose 
producers mostly export, or whose consumers do not have significant market power with respect 
to foreign producers, have little reason to have any competition laws at all, other than as 
cosmetic gestures to appease foreign critics. Japan may be a case in point. States that have 
significant market power but do not provide a home to producers may insist on levels of 
competition that may benefit their consumers but lower efficiency. States in a race to host 
increasing-returns-to-scale industries may block consolidation by rival firms while protecting the 
national champion. All states may avoid bright-line competition rules in favor of nonspecific 
standards that permit selective prosecution of foreign producers to advance protectionist ends.
Each of these outcomes maximizes local welfare to the cost of global efficiency. Multiple 
application of these laws – superimposing the laws of multiple jurisdictions with different 
standards on a single firm – would function simply as a tax on firms operating internationally. 
And a tax on globalization seems perverse and harmful.
What is to be done? Experts have suggested various strategies for harmonizing and unifying 
global competition law. One would locate negotiations over the content of an international 
agreement to harmonize competition law in the WTO and give that organization the authority to 
enforce such an agreement. The current WTO negotiations (the Doha Round) have embraced 
competition law as a topic, although no concrete proposal yet has emerged. Alternatively, the 
major economic powers might agree to allocate regulatory jurisdiction in a way than minimizes 
conflicts among regulators. A series of bilateral agreements to which the United States is a party 
represent modest steps in this direction, and scholars have suggested other architectures for 
jurisdictional allocation. I first describe what these proposals might look like and then discuss 
their drawbacks.
A. International Coordination of the Substance of Competition Law
In both the United States and Europe, the history of competition regulation has been one of 
gradual ascension of the state hierarchy, from the states to the federal government in the United 
States and from nations to the EC in Europe. Should this progression continue, so that an 
international body would take on the responsibility of regulating the competitive practices of 
international businesses? Proposals to do so exist in both soft and hard versions.
1. Proposals for International Administration of Competition Law
Many, perhaps the majority of specialists writing on international antitrust have supported at 
a minimum soft harmonization of competition laws among states. For example, the Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), a group that comprises the world’s richer 
nations, has promulgated guidelines for competition policy to which its members should 
adhere.55 These establish a minimum level of regulation that each state should impose and also 
suggest a baseline to which they should gravitate. In 2000 the U.S. Justice Department’s 
International Antitrust Advisory Committee called for greater standardization of merger review, 
technical assistance to encourage the creation of competition policy and enforcement agencies in 
countries that have none, and gradual assimilation of international practice leading toward 
standardization of competition policy rules.56 This report led to the creation of the International 
Competition Network (ICN), an international organization of government regulators that 
sponsors conferences to promote harmonization.57
Others would go further. Both Eleanor Fox and Andrew Guzman have called for the forging 
of an agreement on competition policy modeled on the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).58 They would have the WTO serve both as the forum for 
negotiating the substance of such an agreement and the agency that resolves disputes over its 
meanings and enforces its obligations. Guzman argues that because harmonization would require 
some states to forego regulatory choices that, at least in the short run, would advantage their 
national interest, negotiations must take place in a structure that maximizes the opportunity for 
winners to compensate losers with concessions in unrelated areas.59 The WTO seems ideal for 
this purpose both because of its scale (146 countries) and scope (its regulatory subjects include 
trade in goods and services, intellectual property, agricultural health and safety, and certain 
forms of investment regulation, among others).
Guzman also has argued for changes in the organizational structure of the WTO to 
accommodate its expanded jurisdiction. He calls for the division of the organization into 
departments, each with responsibility for substantive areas such as trade, competition, 
environment, labor, and intellectual property. Depicting these policy areas as rivalrous, he would 
have each department act as an advocate for its particular subject and rely on WTO internal 
dispute resolution processes to reach compromises.60
The bold new world that Guzman hopes to usher in would entail a single body of competition 
law applicable to firms operating internationally. States would enforce this law, but a department 
of the WTO would supervise their actions to ensure that they neither neglected their obligations 
nor exceeded the international regulatory limits. To the extent conceptions of optimal 
competition law conflicted with those of, say, intellectual property, labor standards, or food 
safety, the WTO would make tradeoffs and then require WTO members to honor them.61
55 The documents take the form of Council Recommendations, which the OECD publishes, along with documents on 
related issues, at http://www.oecd.org/document/59/0,2340,en_2649_37463_4599739_1_1_1_37463,00.html (last visited 
Feb. 26, 2004).
56 International Competition Policy Advisory Commission, U.S. Department of Justice Final Report (2000), 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/icpac/finalreport.htm (last visited Feb. 26, 2004).
57 See note  supra. See also Eleanor M. Fox, International Antitrust and the Doha Dome, note  supra, at 917, 929.
58 Eleanor Fox, International Antitrust and the Doha Dome, note  supra, at 929-30; Andrew T. Guzman, note  supra, at 
951-56.
59 Andrew T. Guzman, note  supra, at 950-51.
60 Andrew T. Guzman, Global Governance and the WTO (working paper, Aug. 15, 2002).
61 Id.
Fox has a less ambitious (or perhaps more idealistic) vision, although hers shares essential 
elements with Guzman’s. She would give the ICN a greater role in formulating an international 
consensus on antitrust policy, although she would rely on the WTO for administration and 
enforcement of that consensus. She believes that states ultimately will develop a unified sense of 
what constitutes an “antitrust harm” and will recognize a universal right to address such harms.62
She does not invoke, but her argument suggests, the rhetoric of international human rights law, 
which presupposes a cosmopolitan international commitment to the eradication of certain 
universally condemned practices.
2. Critique
In previous work I have questioned the value of proposals such as Guzman’ and Fox’s.63
Summarizing my objections here, I note weaknesses in the concept of international 
cosmopolitanism, agency problems associated with international administration of 
nontransparent regulatory programs generally and particularly regarding international dispute 
resolution, the potential drawbacks of executive branch representation of national interests in 
international negotiations, and the difficulty of unwinding international regulatory structures. 
Taken together, these arguments lead one to search for alternatives to globalization of 
competition policy.
a. Cosmopolitanism. Fox invokes the spirit of cosmopolitanism to undergird an optimistic 
account of why many states ultimately may reach a consensus on the content of competition 
policy.64 This concept has become fashionable lately in certain academic circles, although I do 
not know if Fox intends to invoke all that its advocates assert.65 International cosmopolitanism 
takes Rawlsian arguments for justice to the international level, asserting that thoughtful people 
would commit to a level of equality for all humans and therefore would embrace massive 
transnational wealth transfers. In particular, because transnational wealth redistribution achieved 
by individual actions seems overambitious and morally heroic, this body of thought justifies 
strong redistributive programs by states.66
As Fox suggests, the broad claims of cosmopolitanism apply specifically to international 
antitrust. If one accepts the premise that variations among national competition policies reflect 
differences in local welfare, then any convergence toward a global standard would entail making 
some groups in some countries better off, others worse off, and probably would diminish the 
welfare of at least come countries overall (say, OPEC members). Recognition of a universal right 
62 Eleanor Fox, The End of Antitrust Isolationism – The Vision of One World, 1992 U. Chi. L. Forum 221, ___.
63 See sources cited in note  supra.
64 Eleanor M. Fox, International Antitrust and the Doha Dome, note  supra, at 914 (referring to “cosmopolitan 
understanding” of antitrust); Globalization and Human Rights: Looking Out for the Welfare of the Worst Off,35 N.Y.U. J. 
Int’l L. & Pol. 201 (2002).
65 For a discussion and critique, see Jack L. Goldsmith, Liberal Democracy and Cosmopolitan Duty, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 
1667 (2003).
66 See Iris Marion Young, Inclusion and Democracy (2000); Martha C. Nussbaum, Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism, in 
For Love of Country (Joshua Cohen ed. 1996); Martha C. Nussbaum, Toward a Viable Cosmopolitanism (Mar. 1, 2000 
draft); Tomas W. Pogge, An Egalitarian Law of Peoples, 23 Phil. & Pub. Affairs 195 (1994).
of freedom from competitive injury thus implies a commitment by states to international wealth 
redistribution.
While arguments for equality and the redistribution needed to attain it have a certain appeal, 
the ambitious claim of international cosmopolitanism has serious difficulties. First, the idea that 
solidarity transcends distance – that people can identify with and care equally about persons at a 
great cultural as well as physical remove – seems fanciful as a positive matter and problematic as 
a normative one. One does not have to surrender any part of a core commitment to respect and 
care for all humans to recognize both that people flourish among their familiars, and that a great 
variation in culture and environment reflects the natural and desirable variety of humans and 
their corresponding social needs. Rawls recognized this problem when he limited his call for 
international justice to nations sharing similar values and political systems.67 Jack Goldsmith has 
observed that, to the extent state policies reflect the preferences of subjects expressed through the 
processes of liberal democracy, they should take these affinities into account.68
Second, implicit in the cosmopolitan argument is an equation of a financial resources with 
freedom from physical brutality. It is easy to derive from Rawlsian principles a commitment to 
protect all people from murder, torture and other forms of state cruelty, and the cosmopolitan 
position simply extends the point to material well being. But this equation of physical integrity 
and economic status is more slippery than the cosmopolitan argument acknowledges. 
Communities vary wildly in how they express and value economic status. Wealth is a social, and 
therefore local, artifact to a far greater extent than is physical inviolability.69
Third, wealth transfers require exactions from the source of wealth, as a voluntary surrender 
of resources never seems to suffice. Thus, the threat of force (if only in the form of economic 
sanctions) is a necessarily complement to a redistributive project. This in turn means that the risk 
of international conflict is deeply embedded in international redistribution. In the case of 
competition policy, enforcement of a common norm would entail some entity authorized to 
impose sanctions on shirkers and malfeasors. But one cannot contemplate the use of force 
without conceding the possibility of its abuse. At its heart, then, the cosmopolitan position, both 
in general and with respect to international antitrust, contains a commitment to international 
coercion that needs critical examination.
b. Agency costs of international entities. Designing an international body to administer and 
enforce an agreement on substantive competition policy presents serious issues of 
instrumentality design and incentives. It is useful to conceptualize such a body as the agent of the 
various states that collectively wish to implement an agreement on competition policy, much as 
the managers of a business serve as the agent of the firm’s investors. In both cases, the 
fundamental problem involves aligning the agent’s interests with its principal to maximize the 
value of the agency relationship. The principal – here the states seeking to implement a collective 
67 John Rawls, The Law of Peoples (1999).
68 Jack L. Goldsmith, note  supra.
69 I do not mean to deny the Foucaldian point that physical invasion has aspects of social construction. My point is a 
relative one, that perceptions of wealth depend more on social structure than do perceptions of pain.
competition policy – cannot fully anticipate how it wants the agent – here the WTO or some 
comparable body – to respond to future problems. The principal understands that the agent might 
want to maximize some good – its budget, power, glory, leisure, or compensation – that it would 
not want maximized. It must respond to this challenge by structuring the agency relationship so 
at to limit ex ante the agent’s discretion (what the literature calls bonding), supervising what the 
agent does ex post (what the literature calls monitoring), or otherwise tolerating outcomes that do 
not reflect its preferences.70
Just as an investors cannot just hand over their money to managers and ask only that the 
managers maximize their return, states cannot ask an international organ simply to choose a 
competition policy that maximizes global welfare. The states either must accept the risk that the 
organ will make suboptimal choices – perhaps embracing a harebrained economic theory or 
using competition law as a guise to advance some redistributive project – or rein in its discretion 
through some mix of bonding and monitoring. But bonding forecloses some policy responses 
that, in hindsight, would turn out to be optimal. Monitoring consumes resources, and if coupled 
with a right of retaliation, also may induce unwarranted conservatism on the part of the organ’s 
officials.
These are general problems, and have turned out not to be insurmountable in many instances. 
But in the case of international antitrust, they loom especially large. Two features of competition 
policy exacerbate the agency problems accompanying a delegation to an international 
organization. First, the absence of any clear understanding and definition of good competition 
policy makes bonding more problematic. The architects of an international regime either must 
find the few areas where clarity and consensus exists and settle for a seriously incomplete 
regime, or they must trust the international organ with broad discretion. Second, because it is 
likely that any universal competition regime that increases global welfare will make some 
countries worse off, effective monitoring of the organ’s performance will only clarify the scope 
of the injury particular states will experience.71
The history of the GATT and its successor, the WTO, illustrates why adding competition 
policy to the WTO’s already significant responsibilities may not work. The GATT’s great 
achievement was postwar liberalization of the international economy through tariff reduction. 
High tariffs, however, are an ideal subject for international cooperation. This form of protection 
neither disguises itself nor hides its effects. Tariffs single out goods traded internationally for 
special excises stated in precise quantitative terms, and quantification of their effects presents no 
great challenge. Reciprocal tariff reduction agreements thus are easy to negotiate, easy to 
monitor for compliance, and generally do not produce sore losers.
Conversely, when regulation takes the form of case-by- case application of general standards 
shaped by complex policy goals with significant potential for international wealth redistribution, 
those affected by the regulation and those who impose it cannot easily commit to a mutually 
70 See generally Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs 
and Ownership Structure, 3 J. Fin. Econ. 305 (1976).
71 See Paul B. Stephan, Courts, Tribunals, and Legal Unification, note  supra, at 347.
beneficial agreement.72 The experience of the last two decades illustrates the point. The shift in 
the international trade regime’s focus to nontariff trade barriers, including health and safety rules 
and environmental regulation, has embroiled the WTO in great controversy. The agreements 
giving the WTO this authority largely involve ambiguous commitments that raise profound 
interpretative problems. The efforts of the WTO organs to apply this standards to concrete cases 
has triggered intransigence on the part of the states accused of violation, sharp criticism of the 
dispute resolution process within the community of trade experts, and passionate attacks from 
populist forces.73
The WTO has had little direct involvement with competition policy, but the few times it has 
engaged with these problems illustrate the shortcoming of international supervision of national 
competition law. In the Kodak-Fujitsu dispute, the WTO dispute settlement process rejected the 
claim that Japan’s tolerance of inefficient retail distribution networks, which impeded the entry 
of foreign products, constituted an impermissible trade barrier.74 The case had murky facts and 
suffered from less than deft advocacy by the United States, but it still suggests the difficulty of 
detecting disguised protection. Arguably Japan tolerates the gross inefficiencies of small scale 
retail outlets in part because they protect domestic producers from foreign competition, but the 
inference necessary to reach this conclusion was beyond the grasp of the WTO.
A symmetrical dispute involving U.S. antitrust law reinforces the point. The case involved a 
European attack on the Antidumping Act of 1916. This statute, as interpreted by the U.S. courts, 
simply recapitulates the substantive requirements of a predatory pricing violation under the 
Sherman Act.75 No criminal or civil suit under the 1916 Act has ever succeeded. But, because in 
form the 1916 Act regulates dumping in a matter not authorized by the WTO agreements, the 
WTO condemned it as violating U.S. obligations under the 1994 Agreement on Antidumping 
Duties.
Formalism provides the key to understanding both decisions. The WTO has not found it 
possible to deal with costly but hard-to-prove de facto discrimination, but had no difficulty with 
a purely hypothetical case of de jure discrimination.76 Transparent but innocuous conduct 
brought about WTO condemnation, while nontransparent but potentially harmful conduct 
generated no response. Both decisions reflect a reluctance to stray from the uncontroversial 
72 John L. McGinnis &Mark L. Movsesian, note  supra, at 566-72.
73 Robert L. Howse & Elisabeth Tuerk, The WTO Impact on Internal Regulations – A Case Study of the Canada-EC 
Asbestos Dispute, in The EU and the WTO: Legal and Constitutional Issues 283 (Gráinne de Búrca & Joanne Scott eds. 
2001); Alan O. Sykes, Domestic Regulation, Sovereignty, and Scientific Evidence Requirements: A Pessimistic View, 3 
Chi. J. Int’l L. 353 (2002) (technical barriers to trade and WTO dispute resolution process); Daniel K. Tarullo, note  supra, 
at 494 & n.57 (citing disputes over Cuba sanctions, meat hormones, preferences for former colonies, and dolphin 
protection).
74 World Trade Organization, Report of the Panel, Japan – Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film and Paper, 
WTO Doc. No. WT/DS44/R (Mar. 31, 1998). For discussion, see Paul B. Stephan, Courts, Tribunals, and Legal 
Unification, note  supra, at 348-49; Paul B. Stephan, Sheriff or Prisoner? note  supra, at 56-61 (2000); Daniel K. Tarullo, 
note  supra, at 484.
75 See In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 807 F. 2nd 44 (3rd Cir. 1986); note  supra and accompanying text.
76 World Trade Organization, Report of the Appellate Body, United States – Antidumping Act of 1916, Report of the 
Appellate Body, WTO Doc. Nos. WT/DS316/AB/R, WT/DS162/AB/R (Aug. 28, 2000). For discussion, see Paul B. 
Stephan, Courts, Tribunals, and Legal Unification – The Agency Problem, note  supra, at 349.
meaning of the agreements that form the organization’s charter, even at the cost of the 
substantive ends that these agreements purportedly pursue. One cannot expect much more from 
any future agreement on competition policy.
As noted above, Guzman appreciates the present deficiencies of the WTO. His response to 
this challenge is Weberian. He would rely on bureaucratic rationality embodied in distinct, 
policy-defined departments to formulate good policy and negotiate the competing interests.77 In 
effect, he would replace national governments representing the material interests of their 
producers and consumers with technocratic élites guided by substantive expertise.
The ambition of this proposal is so remarkable that one wonders where to begin a critique.78
The classic concern about bureaucratic rationality is that it masks a powerful urge for 
aggrandizement. In the international arena, we have few if any examples of agencies that have 
avoided the temptation. Budgets grow, capacities for effective intervention decline, and faith in 
international policymaking falters, only to rise up again in new areas. Geneva seems a graveyard 
for past idealism, not a hotbed of innovative solutions to the world’s problems.
c. Dispute resolution. Limiting an international agency to the task of settling disputes over 
the meaning and application of an international agreement does not avoid the agency problems 
discussed in the prior section.79 U.S. practice illustrates how the application of indeterminate 
standards shifts discretionary authority and the capacity to shape policy to the dispute resolution 
body. In the United States, antitrust law is what the courts say it is, largely without congressional 
input into the policy’s content.80 In theory, an international tribunal might follow in the footsteps 
of the U.S. judiciary and become the principal source of international competition law. In reality, 
this hope is implausible.
U.S. federal judges have life tenure and a great fund of social capital. They come to the 
bench after achieving distinction in any of a number of legal fields, and they wind up on the 
Supreme Court after facing intense public scrutiny and surviving a daunting political gauntlet. 
They benefit from a tradition of judicial lawmaking that for the most part has gained acceptance 
and even admiration from the general public.
None of these statements can be made about the members of the WTO dispute settlement 
bodies or, for that matter, any adjudicator in the international system. The members of the WTO 
appellate body, the closest analog to a common law appellate court, serve for six years, with 
nomination and replacement at the pleasure of specific countries or blocs, rather than of the 
WTO membership as a whole. Given this short leash, the possibility for articulating and 
77 See note  supra and accompanying text. 
78 For a discussion that anticipates Guzman’s proposal and, to my view, advances devastating objections, see John O. 
McGinnis & Mark L. Movsesian, note  supra, at 552-66.
79 But see id. at 572-89 (arguing for welfare benefits of WTO dispute resolution). I consider the McGinnis-Movsesian 
argument strongest where the WTO addresses disputes over clear and therefore transparent principles. As the clarity of the 
principle dissipates, so does the likelihood of efficacious dispute resolution.
80 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 59-60 (1911). 
imposing a competition policy that any significant state finds undesirable seems unlikely except 
over the very short run.81
d. Executive branches as national agents. In both international bargaining and monitoring of 
international agencies, states act through their executives, not their parliaments. For states 
operating under some version of the Westminister system where the leading parliamentary party 
forms the executive, this point may not have much significance. But even in these countries, 
actors within the executive may have interests that diverge from that of the legislature, including 
possibly a preference for larger budgets, projects that show off the executive to good effect, and 
work that increases the actors’ future returns from their post-political careers. And in many 
states, the executive operates under the influence of a different political party from that enjoying 
dominance in the legislature. This separation may exist even if the executive answers directly to 
parliament, as in a Westminister system, where no single party controls the legislature.
I previously have argued that these factors may express themselves as a tendency of 
governments to commit to harmonization and unification projects that produce little hard law but
provide officials with high-profile venues to display themselves.82 One might even suggest that 
the ICN constitutes a case in point. These efforts may seem harmless enough, but they have the 
potential to destabilize the legal environment in which firms operate. They may distract 
individual states from desirable changes in their competition laws, induce cosmetic changes to 
appeal to the international audience, and send confusing signals to bureaucrats and judges 
responsible for interpreting and applying national law.
e. Inflexibility in the face of changed circumstances. Law-based international institutions are 
hard to create and even harder to reform. The principle of unanimity that applies to treaty 
systems means that amendments, like the initial institution, require unanimous consent. As 
circumstances change, it often becomes desirable to alter the mandate and tools of the regime, 
but holdouts are likely. For this reason, international regimes tend to administer broad standards 
and norms rather than precise rules, and they tend to collapse or become irrelevant rather than 
reform themselves. Important counterexamples exist, but compared to both private firms and 
states, international organizations manifest inferior adaptive capability.83
B. International Coordination of Regulatory Jurisdiction
Recognizing the many obstacles to substantive harmonization of competition law, some 
governments and commentators have considered coordination of jurisdiction as an alternative 
way of addressing the overlapping jurisdiction problem.84 The ideal is universal acceptance of 
jurisdictional criteria that would submit transactions to one, and only one, regulatory authority. 
The search for jurisdictional stability underlay the forty-year struggle between the United States 
81 Paul B. Stephan, Courts, Tribunals, and Legal Unification – The Agency Problem, note  supra, at 336-38.
82 Paul B. Stephan, Accountability and International Lawmaking, note  supra, at 695-97.
83 Cf. Albert O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice and Loyalty (1970).
84 For a thorough review of the literature, see Joel P. Trachtman, Economic Analysis of Prescriptive Jurisdiction, 42 Va. 
J. Int’l L. 1 (2001); 
and its trading partners over the “effects” test for antitrust jurisdiction as well as justifying the 
various agreements between the Justice Department and other states on antitrust enforcement.
1. Allocations of Regulatory Jurisdiction
In a simpler world of mechanical and formalistic jurisdictional tests, overlapping regulatory 
authority did not pose a problem. Only the sovereign on whose territory a transaction occurred 
would impose its rules.85 But with the rise of multijurisdictional transactions, territoriality came 
under pressure. U.S. courts first relaxed the territorial test by requiring that only some part of the 
transaction in question occur in U.S. territory.86 By the end of World War II, the lower courts 
cast aside even that constraint, instead applying U.S. antitrust law to any action that had direct 
and intended effects in the United States.87 Europe and the Commonwealth countries resisted this 
approach, but by the end of the 1980s the EC had incorporated the effects test into its own 
competition law.88
Almost as soon as the effects test emerged as the U.S. standard for international antitrust, 
some courts and commentators proposed to limit it. It is unclear whether the critics foresaw the 
potential costs of multiple regulation or simply disliked the foreign criticism that the test 
generated. For whatever reason, their efforts dominated most discussion of international antitrust 
during the 1970s and 1980s. The leading treatise on international antitrust proposed that courts 
use a “rule of reason,” base on multiple criteria, to limit U.S. jurisdiction in cases that otherwise 
satisfied the effects test.89 The object of the test was to restrict the exercise of jurisdiction in 
some instances where the effects test would permit regulation. It did not purport to create a world 
where every transaction would have one and only one regulator, but it did aspire to reduce the 
instances of multijurisdictional conflicts.
The Ninth Circuit embraced the rule-of-reason standard, and the Third Restatement of the 
Foreign Relations Law of the United States proclaimed it the general norm.90 The campaign to 
limit antitrust jurisdiction suffered a setback in 1993, when, in Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. 
California,91 a narrow majority of the Supreme Court both endorsed the effects test and rejected 
the rule-of-reason limitation. But poor argumentation in the majority’s opinion has enabled 
litigants to keep alive the prospect of the rule of reason’s reemergence.92
As this account illustrates, disputes over jurisdictional scope typically take place in the 
judicial arena. Legislators typically fail to address the issue of extraterritorial regulation, and 
courts usually craft choice-of-law rules to fill in statutory lacunae. In the case of antitrust, 
85 American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909) (dictum).
86 United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268 (1927).
87 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2nd 416 (2nd Cir. 1945).
88 In re Wood Pulp Cartel (Case 89/85), [1988] E.C.R. 5193.
89 1 James R. Atwood & Kingman Brewster, Antitrust and American Business Abroad 166 (1981).
90 Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2nd 597 (9th Cir. 1976); Restatement (Third) of the Foreign 
Relations Law of the United States § 403 (1987).
91 509 U.S. 764 (1993).
92 See United States v. Nippon Paper Industries Co., 109 F.3rd 1, 26-27 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1044 (1998).
however, some intergovernmental agreements also seek to distribute regulatory jurisdiction. The 
U.S. Justice Department has negotiated compacts with Australia, Canada, the EU, Japan and 
Mexico, among others.93
Superficially, these agreements appear to address the problems of overlapping regulation. A 
review of their terms, however, reveals that they do not even create soft law. Rather, the bilateral 
agreements express only a desire to consult and cooperate, and do not limit the discretion of any 
regulatory authorities. None of these instruments has terms that a U.S. court could enforce, and 
the US-EC agreement entails judicial enforcement only in the sense that it provides the EC 
Commission with an additional grounds for making demands of national regulators.94 Each 
purports to embrace the rule of reason as the basic concept for allocating regulatory jurisdiction, 
but all use a long list of unweighted criteria that have the effect of insulating almost all exercises 
of regulator review from attack. Moreover, the agreements do not seek to coordinate merger 
approval, the area that has caused the greatest recent tension. If anything, the bilateral 
agreements illustrate the conflicting interests that jurisdictions have in imposing their 
competition law on international transactions, and the difficulties of surrendering regulatory 
discretion in spite of the potential benefits obtained by a reduction of overlapping constraints on 
private transactors.
Finally, one should note the ongoing negotiations regarding a Hague Convention on 
International Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters.95 This 
multilateral instrument, if adopted, might limit the power of a signatory state to exercise some 
regulatory jurisdiction over extraterritorial transactions, and would make civil judgments 
produced by proceedings that conform to the convention subject to execution by all parties to the 
Convention. But no one who follows these negotiations seriously believes that the United States 
will sign the Convention or that Congress would accede to it. Rather, even this modest attempt to 
reach an international consensus on the allocation of regulatory jurisdiction seems an entirely 
academic exercise.
To summarize, the courts have supplied three different strategies for allocating regulatory 
jurisdiction. The territorial approach would severely limit the scope of competition law in cases 
where production took place offshore. The effects test maximizes a state’s regulatory power. The 
rule of reason muddles these two approaches. In theory states might agree to concrete and 
specific allocations of authority, but nothing achieved to date meets this description. To the 
contrary, the agreements we have suggest the difficulty of imposing significant constraints on 
national regulatory power.
2. Critique
93 For texts of the agreements, see http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/international/int_arrangements.htm (last visited feb. 
26, 2004).
94 See France v. Commission (Case C-327/91), [1994] E.C.R. I-3641 (discussing enforceability of agreement as 
Community law).
95 Preliminary Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (Oct. 1999), at 
http://www.hcch.net/e/conventions/draft36e.html last visit Feb. 26, 2004).
The use of rules that allocate regulatory jurisdiction as a substitute for unification of 
substantive law is most closely associated with U.S. corporate law. During the last decade 
Roberta Romano has produced an influential reappraisal of this subject.96 Her work has 
developed a conceptual apparatus that translates into other substantive areas and, in due course, 
has led to a rich and lively scholarly debate about regulatory competition generally.97
As Romano observed, the challenge is choosing jurisdictional criteria that will not promote a 
flight of transactions to a jurisdiction that permits significant externalization of the transactions’ 
costs. Her work is a response to the traditional critique of the formalistic U.S. choice-of-law rule 
for corporate law (place of incorporation), which asserts that managers incorporate in 
jurisdictions that maximize their opportunities to enrich themselves at the expense of investors. 
The “race to the bottom” metaphor arose in this context.98
Romano demonstrated that managers often will have to internalize the costs associated with 
rules that enabled them to exploit investors, and thus should have a preference for rules that 
maximize firm value. She found in corporate law a virtuous race to the top, where her 
predecessors had seen only a regrettable regulatory collapse. Stephen Choi and Andrew Guzman 
extended her argument to the international arena, advocating a regime that would allow the 
issuers of securities to choose which jurisdiction would regulate their transactions.99
A consensus does not exist regarding the validity of Romano’s empirical claims about U.S. 
corporate law, much less Choi and Guzman’s extension. The debate focuses mostly on the 
supply rather than the demand side, involving arguments over the willingness of states to 
compete for corporate charters.100 Most scholars, however, agree with the analytics underlying 
96 Roberta Romano, The Genius of American Corporate Law (1993); Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A 
Market Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 Yale L.J. 2359 (1998); Roberta Romano, The Advantages of Competitive 
Federalism for Securities Regulation (2002).
97 See also Regulatory Competition and Economic Integration – Comparative Perspectives (Daniel C. Esty and Damien 
Geradin eds 2001); International Regulatory Competition and Coordination: Perspectives on Economic Regulation in 
Europe and the United States (William W. Bratton, Joseph A. McCahery, Sol Picciotto & Colin Scott eds. 1996); William 
W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, The New Economics of Jurisdictional Competition: Devolutionary Federalism in a 
Second-Best World, 86 Geo. L.J. 201 (1997); Joel P. Trachtman, International Regulatory Competition, Externalization, 
and Jurisdiction, 34 Harv. Int’l L.J. 47 (1993). Earlier influential work includes Warren E. Oates & Wallace M. Schwab, 
Economic Competition Among Jurisdictions: Efficiency Enhancing or Distortion Inducing, 35 J. Pub. Econ. 333 (1988); 
Frank H. Easterbrook, Antitrust and the Economics of Federalism, 26 J. L. & Econ. 23 (1983); Saul Levmore, Interstate 
Exploitation and Judicial Intervention, 69 Va. L. Rev. 563 (1983); Charles Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 
64 J. Pol. Econ. 416 (1956).
98 Adolph A. Berle & Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (1932).
99 Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking the International Reach of Securities 
Regulation, 71 S. Cal. L. Rev. 903 (1998); Andrew T. Guzman, Capital Market Regulation in Developing Countries: A 
Proposal, 39 Va. J. Int’l L. 607 (1999). See also John C. Coffee, Jr., Racing Toward the Top? The Impact of Cross-
Listings and Stock Market Competition on International Corporate Governance, 102 Colum. L. Rev. 1757 (2002); Roberta 
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Romano’s claim: The degree to which formal and transactionally determinable choice-of-law 
rules should apply depends primarily on externalities. To the extent that the ratio of externalized 
costs to benefits matches that of those internalized, the transactors, at least if they meet minimum 
standards of competence, should have the freedom to choose their regulatory environment. 
Under these conditions, a race to the top can occur.
Using Romano’s framework, the argument that competition regulation is susceptible to a race 
to the bottom, and therefore should not be subject to transactor choice, is straightforward. At its 
heart competition law involves producer conduct, either unilateral or in concert, that may have 
harmful effects on consumers. Allowing producers to choose which regime will regulate the 
harm they impose on consumers would make sense only if consumers could boycott producers 
that choose consumer-unfriendly regimes. But competition law, at least in theory, focuses on 
exactly the kinds of producer actions that reduce consumer choice. If the touchstone is the 
likelihood of externalities, producer choices about competition law generally should have no 
significance.101
Straightforward analysis also demonstrates that none of the three rules used by the courts for 
allocating state regulatory jurisdiction will produce optimal outcomes.102 First, a universal 
commitment to territoriality would prevent a state from regulating offshore producers intending 
inefficiently to limit competition in the state’s market. Barring all such desirable regulation can 
be justified only if one can demonstrate that on balance extraterritorial regulation would decrease 
welfare. But some states might limit competition rules to cases that both maximize efficiency 
and increase consumer welfare. Moreover, in industries where production is moveable, and firms 
thus can induce states to compete for their activities, producers would exploit a territoriality 
regime to move to states with producer-friendly regimes.
Symmetrical arguments expose the flaws in the effects test. That approach multiplies the 
number of states with jurisdiction over transactions and thus increases the likelihood that private 
organizational decisions will confront governmental resistance. As with the territorial rule, 
whether governmental intervention will increase welfare constitutes an empirical consideration. 
There is no categorical reason to believe that the benefits from desirable competition rules 
permitted by the effects test necessarily will be greater that the costs generated by inefficient 
regulation.103 The most one can claim for the effects test is that is maximizes sovereignty by 
101 Some subjects, such as contracts implementing vertical cooperation, may present sufficiently debatable competition 
issues to justify deference to the transactors. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 
(1985). These contracts typically involve merchants who have some competitive choices prior to their entry into the 
agreement and involve project-specific investments that on balance may increase welfare. See generally Charles J. Goetz 
& Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 Va. L. Rev. 1089 (1981). Under these circumstances, the parties 
are more likely to internalize the costs of whatever competition regime they choose, and without the freedom to choose 
they may pass up valuable transactions.
102 See Andrew T. Guzman, Choice of Law: New Foundations, note  supra, at 904-13.
103 William Dodge argues that courts should express a bias in favor of over-regulation on the ground that special interests 
find it easier to block regulation they disfavor than to have enacted legislation that they favor. William S. Dodge, An 
Economic Defense of Concurrent Antitrust Jurisdiction, 38 Tex. Int’l L.J.27, 33-36 (2003). The argument confuses 
prudential concerns with welfare claims. Courts might defer to legislative choices about jurisdiction on the ground that 
they do not have the capacity to second-guess legislative choices. But it does not follow that because special interests have 
allowing states to choose the scope of their regulation free of international constraints. But 
maximization of sovereign choice is not necessarily a good thing. Arguments for expanding 
individual choice do not translate to the level of the state.104
The one approach that seems unambiguously flawed is the rule of reason. William Dodge 
misstates the case when he characterizes this approach as producing the same outcome as the 
territorial method.105 Rather, the rule of reason only increases the likelihood that one state, 
presumably the place of production, will impose its competition rules. But unlike either the 
territoriality rule or the effects test, the rule of reason contains a high degree of instability and 
unpredictability. It allows courts to balance unweighted factors on an ex post basis, making 
reliable guesses about regulatory jurisdiction difficult if not impossible. It creates legal risk 
without eliminating the costs of either under-regulation or over-regulation.
If the judicially crafted formulas for allocating jurisdiction produce suboptimal outcomes, 
should governments enter into agreements to allocate regulatory jurisdiction? The extant 
agreements suggest that we already have reached the limits of state-to-state bargains. No state 
seems willing to submit to serious and enforceable constraints on its regulatory jurisdiction. Two 
reasons for this reluctance suggest themselves. First, states will not surrender jurisdiction to 
regulate without some clear and reliable expectation of what substantive rules other states will 
apply. Second, and following from the first, states recognize that the jurisdiction issue simply 
recasts the question of preferences for substantive competition rules.
This last point also suggests why a global bargain to allocate competition policy jurisdiction 
may be undesirable as well as unattainable. On reflection, the jurisdictional question presents 
exactly the same issues and problems as does substantive harmonization. There is no neutral 
template for allocation that transcends the interests engaged by competition law, and no reason to 
believe that those interests would not affect the structure of any international bargain. In 
particular, giving an international agency responsibility for supervising how states exercise their 
jurisdiction would lead to exactly the same agency problems discussed in the previous section.
C. The Future of International Supervision of Antitrust
The EU, the United States, and most scholars have treated international antitrust as a problem 
that international institutions can solve. The details of the solutions differ, but they have in 
common a conviction that an international forum will serve as a means for transcending local 
interests of states in favor of global welfare. This faith in international cooperation is misplaced. 
a comparative advantage in blocking adverse legislation, that only public-regarding regulation will pass through this filter. 
It is just as plausible that we see less legislation than we might because of the comparative advantage of compact groups, 
but that the legislation we do see still reflects private rather than public interests.
104 I previously have criticized commentators that invoke the concept of sovereignty as justification for particular 
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Analogies to trade agreements do not work, because the interests at stake in competition policy 
are far less transparent and far more likely to involved international wealth redistribution than 
those triggered by direct trade barriers, making competition law far less susceptible to oversight 
and satisfactory dispute settlement. We have every reason to believe that international 
supervision either will be inconsequential, along the lines of existing agreements on international 
antitrust, or pernicious.
My critique opens the way to reconsidering what may happen if states do not face 
international constraints on how they conduct their competition policy. Given certain plausible 
assumptions about the world economy, in particular those sectors that draw significantly on skill 
and innovation, an anarchic international environment may contain substantial impediments to a 
global race to the bottom in competition law. I explore this possibility in the next section.
III. ANARCHY, INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST, INNOVATION AND INVESTMENT
In the first part of this paper, I described a static model that predicts what competition law a 
state will enact and enforce. This model rests on two assumptions, that states seek to maximize a 
weighted sum of local consumer and producer interests, and that the choice of competition policy 
has no secondary effects on consumer or producer welfare. The model regards states as choosing 
among a fixed set of outcomes that proceed directly from particular competition policies. 
Choices in one time period do not affect the set of choices available in the next.
A dynamic model, by contrast, assumes that choices made in the first time period alter the 
possibilities available in the next. I focus on a model of innovation that emphasizes increasing 
marginal returns and explore the relationship of this model to competition. One inference drawn 
from this model is that inefficient competition policy can lead to long-term losses in a globally 
competitive economy.
The question remains whether the static or the dynamic model offers a better fit for particular 
sectors of the world economy. In industries such as agriculture and natural resource extraction, 
the distribution of location-specific natural endowments may dominate welfare calculations and 
innovation may play a less important role. In these sectors, we would expect to find inefficient 
industrial structures that generate, or at least seek, monopoly rents, along with significant levels 
of trade protection. But in other, knowledge-based sectors, mobile factors of production, namely 
human and financial capital, play a greater role. In these industries, a dynamic model provides a 
better fit, because protection, either through government regulation or private collusion, may 
affect access to human and financial capital.
Where the dynamic model applies, international intervention to regulate competition policy 
may be unnecessary. States that embrace inefficient competition policies to protect local 
producers or to benefit local consumers should experience lower rates of innovation and 
eventually lose the ability to compete internationally. Even though not all economic sectors or 
states will experience this effect, enough will to call into question the need to institutionalize 
international competition policy.
A. Knowledge and Industrial Structure
A dynamic model of international competition policy depends critically on the propositions 
that innovative pressures in some important economic sectors force producers to innovate or exit, 
that protection from competitive pressure undermines the ability of producers to innovate, and 
that producers in economic decline will eventually lose political influence as well. I explore each 
of these propositions in turn.
First, consider the relationship between innovation and market success. A substantial 
theoretical literature explores the impact of knowledge-based investments on economic growth. 
In the standard model, knowledge has low reproduction costs. Returns on knowledge thus 
depend critically on the size of the market in which goods embodying knowledge can be sold.106
Increases in the scope of the market, such as the creation of the U.S. common market in the 
nineteenth century and of Europe’s in the second half of the twentieth, expand the opportunities 
for exploiting knowledge and thus rewards investments in knowledge more greatly. Trade 
liberalization and other strategies for broadening market size thus raise incentives to invest in 
knowledge.107
Recent research tends to support this hypothesis. Studies by Jeffrey Frankel and coauthors 
have demonstrated a strong positive correlation between trade openness and labor productivity, a 
good proxy for innovation.108 A more recent paper by Francisco Alcalá and Antonio Ciccone 
refines these results by looking at the relationship between productivity and openness in tradable 
goods, as opposed to gross measurements of an economy’s openness to trade.109 Their analysis 
shows an even stronger link between innovation and an economy’s exposure to international 
competition.
It is important to clarify what this work does and does not indicate. Under conventional 
models of development, a country’s economic growth depends both on its physical and human 
capital and on its efficiency in using these assets. Other considerations, in particular institutional 
quality, has a strong relationship with levels of capital stocks, and the link between economic 
openness and institutional quality is not well understood. What the empirical work indicates, 
then, is not that openness is the most influential factor in economic growth, but that it is an 
important factor in explaining how effectively an economy exploits the stock of physical and 
human capital it has.
106 See Paul M. Romer, Endogenous Technological Change, 98 J. Pol. Econ. S71, 72 (1990):
Once the cost of creating a new set of instructions has been incurred, the instructions can be used over and over 
again at no additional cost. Developing new and better instructions is equivalent to incurring a fixed cost. This 
property is taken to be the defining characteristic of technology.
107 For empirical evidence, see Richard R. Nelson & Gavin Wright, The Rise and Fall of American Technological 
Leadership: The Postwar Era in Historical Perspective, 30 J. Econ. Lit. 1931 (1992).
108 Jeffrey A. Frankel & David Romer, Does Trade Cause Growth? 89 Amer. Econ. Rev. 379 (1999); Jeffrey Frankel & 
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Other arguments support the proposition that barriers to competition will impede investment 
as well as innovation. Monopoly rents derive from restricting production below a level that 
efficient competition would dictate. Lowering production implies, although it does not require, 
reducing the level of investment in the industry. Barriers to entry, whether imposed by private 
agreement or the state, implies fewer opportunities for the deployment of capital.110
To be sure, the link between investment and barriers to competition is not as well 
documented as that between innovation and market size. But the hypothesis that inefficient limits 
on competition serve as a barrier to investment is plausible. Some data support an indirect 
inference. The strong finding in the trade literature that declining industries, rather than infant 
ones, have the greatest demand for protection is suggestive.111 It implies that industries that have 
lost their capacity to attract new investment tend to seek less competitive market structures.
These claims explain why competition policy that does not pursue efficiency will prove 
costly to states. First, states that permit local producers to construct inefficient constraints on 
competition are functionally equivalent to states that undertake such protection directly. 
Tolerance of inefficient collusion in an industry is likely to lead to lower rates of investment and 
innovation than otherwise would obtain. For industries that depend significantly on human and 
financial capital, these losses should lead to low growth or shrinkage in the affected sector. 
Gradual immiserization eventually should either impair an industry’s ability to resist regulation 
or lead to its economic irrelevance.
Second, states that use their competition law to impose inefficient organizational structures 
on foreign producers, with the object of protecting local producers, encourage lower rates of 
investment and innovation in the protected sector. If bad competition law is the functional 
equivalent of trade protectionism, then equivalent consequences should follow. The sector 
should become increasingly uncompetitive internationally and eventually wither.
One can immediately anticipate a counter argument drawn from one strand of strategic trade 
theory. Where oligopolists contend for an industry characterized by positive returns to scale, 
state intervention may tip the balance. This intervention might include punishing foreign 
producers with competition law to facilitate the local producer’s ascendancy as the efficient 
global monopolist.112 If states generally can choose when to invest in industries that will become 
globally dominant, then they should include competition law among the tools that they can use to 
implement such decisions.
110 Early statement of the connection between monopolization and reduced opportunities for investment can be found in 
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111 For a review of the evidence and a theoretical justification, see see Oona A. Hathaway, Positive Feedback: The 
Impact of Trade Liberalization on Industry Demands for Protection, 52 Int’l Org. 575 (1998).
112 U.S. Competitiveness in the World Economy (Bruce Scott & George C. Lodge eds. 1987); James A. Brander & 
Barbara J. Spencer, Export Subsidies and International Market Share Rivalry, 16 J. Int’l Econ. 83 (1985). For claims about 
the feasability of government selection of winning technologies by persons whose later record in governments to some 
extend undermines their thesis, see Ira Magaziner & Robert Reich, Minding America’s Business (1982).
Considerable evidences suggests, however, that states rarely do a good job of picking 
winners. A decade ago many U.S. scholars saw Japan as a model of successful strategic trade 
policy. Invoking this model, they purported to identify U.S. industries where government-led 
success would generate great local benefits at no significant global cost. Revisionist studies of 
Japanese policy reveal that the government generally supported industries that did not have much 
success in international competition and did little for those sectors – automobiles and consumer 
electronics – where Japanese producers did enjoy some success.113 More generally, as noted 
above, governments tend to weigh in on behalf on declining industries more often than they 
bestow favors on rising sectors.114
This argument for virtuous pressures to produce efficient competition law is subject to two 
important qualifications. First, states that serve as a base of operations for firms that largely 
export their products may seek to free ride on the regulatory efforts of importing states. If no 
single importing state were to consume a substantial share of the global output of such producers, 
those states might not invest sufficient resources in imposing competition rules. Under these 
circumstances, consumers over the short run would suffer losses due to excess prices and low 
supply, while the producing country might witness the eventual decline of the industry it hosts. 
Here collective action by the affected states to impose an appropriate competition policy might 
produce a better outcome.
Second, the argument assumes that states eventually will respond to the decline of local 
producers by withdrawing the protection that contributes to their decline. There is some point at 
which this assumption must be correct: An industry that collapses completely must not have any 
ability to procure desired outcomes from government. But it does not follow that economic and 
political decline must be symmetrical. A sense of beleaguerment might lead an industry to 
overcome internal divisions and concentrate more directly on influencing governmental 
outcomes. The U.S. steel industry provides a case in point: Although some firms have increased 
their international competitiveness through increased investment and higher labor productivity, 
others have used adversity as a ground for procuring repeated episodes of protection from import 
competition and have made no significant improvements in their production methods. There is 
plenty of evidence that failing industries can obtain costly protection until collapse becomes 
imminent.
These qualifications are important, but do not seriously undermine the claim that virtuous 
forces make international cooperation less imperative. First, the free-riding scenario seems 
somewhat hypothetical. States generally have some incentive to protect their consumers from 
anticompetitive practices, whether or not the local injury is a large portion of the global injury. 
Most importantly, they do not have to limit their remedies to recovery of the cost of local injury. 
Criminal sanctions, punitive damages and injunctions give local authorities the capacity to 
address a local harm proportionately to its global ramifications.
113 See sources cited in note  supra.
114 Hathaway proposes a theory that ties the withering away of protection to the decline of protected industries. Oona A. 
Hathaway, note  supra.
Second, the disconnect between economic and political power is a general problem and not 
limited to local law production and enforcement. Any state that will protect a failing industry by 
prosecuting its foreign rivals will use its international relations to pursue similar goals. In 
particular, such a state will block any international accord that takes away its discretion to 
impose such protection.
I do not mean to suggest that the appeal of a competition law that both frustrates inefficient 
collusion and does not impede beneficial industrial cooperation is always manifest, or that the 
consequences of bad competition law is immediately painful. Rather, I make two claims. First, in 
industries that compete for capital internationally and that can realize significant returns from 
increases in labor productivity, good competition law matters. Second, the political mechanism 
that mediates between an industry’s economic status and a state’s policy preferences should not 
change when the state pursues those preferences through international cooperation rather than by 
domestic lawmaking and enforcement. These claims in turn suggest that, with respect to 
economic sectors dependent on human and financial capital, states have some incentive to 
eschew competition policies that otherwise might generate short-term gains at the expense of 
global welfare.
B. Regulatory Competition and International Antitrust Revisited
Models of regulatory competition, such as those developed in Romano’s work, invoke a 
stylized market in which states (putative sellers) offer packages of law to firms (putative buyers) 
under conditions of consumer choice. In these models, states gain some benefit by having firms 
choose their law and thus wish to attract these buyers; firms choose laws that maximize benefits 
to the firms’ decisionmakers. As I argued above, setting up such a market for competition law 
seems undesirable. We would expect firms not to choose laws that maximize general welfare, but 
rather to seek opportunities for monopoly rents. For this reason, we do not find it disturbing that, 
in the contemporary world, firms have little influence over the choice of competition regulation 
that will apply to their activities. For the most part firms can avoid a state’s competition law only 
by abandoning that jurisdiction entirely, neither producing, selling, basing personnel, or holding 
attachable assets in the territory of that state.
The dynamic model of competition law’s effects on innovation and investment, however, 
introduces an indirect form of regulatory competition. If states compete for capital and 
opportunities to generate returns from knowledge, they should have some incentive to choose 
competition law that increases its opportunities for both. Under this model, states would not 
compete for producers as such, but rather for capital and innovation. To the extent good 
competition law increases a state’s attraction for either, a virtuous cycle may proceed. Such a 
cycle would substitute for international coordination of state choices.
This vision of virtuous competition for innovation and investment is not as far fetched as one 
might think. A conventional story about the rise of Europe, endorsed by a Nobel prize winner 
and supported by a recent review of the historical evidence, stresses the pressure placed on 
nearby states by innovation in their neighbors.115 The evidence suggests that rent-seeking 
becomes more expensive in the face of a neighbor’s technological progress, and that competition 
among neighbors offers a powerful explanation for a state’s willingness to sacrifice vested 
interests in the service of adaptation. Europe, a geographically fragmented entity, experienced 
more of this competition; the geographically vast and hermetic empires of China and Russia did 
not. And in today’s world, with lower costs in transportation and communication, geographical 
contiguity places less of a role in economic competition among states than in the past.116
This hypothesis requires important qualifications. First, it applies largely to high value-added 
goods, including services, and not to industries that depend mostly on factor endowments. 
Second, the mechanism driving the virtuous cycle is considerably less transparent than the 
seemingly straightforward competition for corporate charters, a contest the existence of which 
still remains subject to debate.117 The incentive for virtuous policy involves a long-term effect 
rather than short-term payoffs. One might plausibly respond that political cycles do not run this 
long, and that no one can realistically expect political actors to respond reliably to such forces.
These objections have great force. Their rebuttal depends largely on guess about the future 
rather than on evidence from the past. The fundamental issue is the nature and extent of the much 
hyped “new economy” at the international level. For virtuous competition in competition policy 
to have much purchase, two discernible trends in international economic relations will have to 
become more pronounced. First, the portion of international transfers involving high value-added 
goods will have grow even more. Second, the pace of technological innovation, and the response 
of mobile capital to this pace, also will have to quicken. These developments would increase the 
importance of competition policy and shorten the time between policy choice and economic 
consequences.
Looking only at the last three years, one might argue that the new economy never was much 
more than a pipe dream, and that any expectation of its near term recovery rests on irrational 
hope more than evidence. If one were to expand the horizon to the past decade, however, the 
story becomes more complicated and less fanciful. Japan, a country that exports capital rather 
than investing it at home and that displays considerable structural rigidity and resistance to 
domestic competition, has experienced zero or negative growth during the period. The EU, with 
a competition policy that has more bite than Japan’s but still seems to protect local producers 
more than does U.S. policy, has not enjoyed nearly the same growth in labor productivity or 
inflows of capital that the United States has seen. Push back fifty years and the picture becomes 
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even muddier, with postwar recovery driving great early growth in Japan and Europe. One 
simply cannot make any strong claim, positive or negative.
Still, the possibility that competition law can become the subject of a race to the top remains 
intriguing. If one takes seriously my criticism of international cooperation, international anarchy 
can start to look good. The chance that trends now at work in the world economy may reduce the 
need for hard law at the international level should temper our enthusiasm for lawmaking projects 
that a minimum divert resources, and possible may make the problems of international antitrust 
worse.
IV. CONCLUSION
In the last decade or so economists have developed the concept of “government failure” to 
complement the traditional notion of “market failure.”118 The idea, roughly put, is that the 
structure of government can cause suboptimal outcomes and avoidable deadweight losses. The 
broader implication of the concept is that an analyst cannot make the case for government action 
simply by identifying a market failure. Always there remains the question of whether a 
governmental response will make the problem better or worse. The economist’s cliché, 
“Compared to what?” applies here too.
This paper argues that the problem of government failure exists at the international level. To 
make the point, I have focused on a classic market failure problem, namely private actions that 
frustrate competition. A conventional analysis argues that, in a world of international transactions, 
states will fail to pursue competition policy that maximizes global efficiency. Most analysts have 
taken this argument to dispose of the question of whether some kind of international governance 
is necessary to respond to the problem, with disagreement limited to the best design of the 
institutional response. I, in contrast, argue that a serious risk of government failure attends any 
proposal for serious international governance in this area, and that under certain assumptions the 
market failure may not be as great as first believed.
Why has the policy consensus so largely settled on a different approach? Perhaps I am simply 
a contrarian, and the case for some kind of international governance is stronger than I 
acknowledge. One should consider, however, reasons why policy debate might skew in favor of 
governance even in the absence of a strong affirmative case.
A sociological observation might provide one answer. Legal élites benefit from governmental 
action. They design the structure, staff it, and criticize it. This general point takes on particular 
salience in the international arena, where messy encumbrances on élite policy formation –
elections, competitors, and the like – do not exist. For someone committed to the proposition that 
ideas and articulateness have a privileged role in policy formation, international governance is an 
inviting playground.
118 See Anne O. Krueger, Government Failures in Development, 4 J. Econ. Persp. 9 (1990).
The possibility that technological innovation and capital might provide a better check on 
anticompetitive behavior than do government agents is especially disconcerting for members of 
this class. The people who make these economic forces possible – compulsive tinkerers, lunatic 
risk-takers – often have little affinity with the bright, well spoken and presentable folks who make 
legal institutions work.119 Ceding power to people who often cannot explain what they do is 
sufficiently unwelcome that fair minded lawyers will struggle with evidence suggesting that they 
should.
I do not claim that this sociological explanation suffices as a ground for governmental 
inaction across the board. Rather, it suggests that the proponents of new governmental structures, 
free of the constraints that bind national states, bear a special burden of justification and need to 
draw on extra reserves of skepticism. The current debate on international antitrust wants these 
qualities.
119 See also Robert Nozick, Why Do Intellectuals Oppose Capitalism? 20 Cato Online Policy Report (Jan.-Feb. 1998), 
published at http://www.cato.org/pubs/policy_report/cpr-20n1-1.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2004).
